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ABSTRACT
This study investigated eyewitnesses’ memory and confidence accuracy for action information (what 
happened at the crime scene), and detail information (descriptions of persons, objects, time and place). In 
Experiment 1, 89 participants watched a film and participated in one of four conditions: Laboratory 
discussion, Family discussion, Retell and Control, the first three with five meetings each. Three weeks later 
all participants open free recalled the events, and confidence judged their answers. The participants 
showed better free recall and confidence accuracy for action than for detail information. Participants in the 
two discussion conditions and in the Retell condition recalled more items and those in the Lab-discussion 
and Retell conditions more correct items for action information, than those in Control group. However, the 
four conditions did not differ for proportion correct of all action items recalled and confidence accuracy for 
action items. In brief, Experiment 1 showed that witness discussions and retellings of the experienced 
event with others improved recall for action information but had had no, or small, effects on confidence 
accuracy. Experiment 2 investigated recall and confidence accuracy performance for action and detail 
information using focused questions. Seventy-seven participants watched a film, answered and confidence 
judged 63 questions about action and detail information about the events. Again, participants showed 
better memory and confidence accuracy for action information. Overall, the results indicate that, for both 
free recall and focused questions, witnesses’ recall and confidence accuracy is better for action information 
than for detail information, thus extra precaution is needed in the forensic system when detail information 
from witnesses is considered. 
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. All rights reserved. 
Efectos de diferentes tipos de información forense en la exactitud de la confianza 
y memoria del testigo visual 
RESUMEN
Este estudio analizó la precisión de la memoria y confianza de los testigos para la información de acción (lo 
que sucedió en la escena del crimen), y la información de detalles (descripción de personas, objetos, tiempo 
y lugar). En el Experimento 1, 89 participantes vieron una película y participaron en una de las cuatro posi-
bles condiciones: Discusión en el laboratorio, Discusión familiar, Volver a contar la historia, y Control, las 
tres primeras condiciones con cinco encuentros cada una. Tres semanas después, todos los participantes 
relataron los hechos mediante recuerdo libre, y juzgaron la confianza que tenían en sus respuestas. Los 
participantes mostraron mejor recuerdo y precisión para la información de acción que para la de detalle. 
Los participantes de las dos condiciones de discusión y de la condición de volver a contar la historia recor-
daron más ítems, y aquellos que participaron en la discusión de laboratorio y en volver a contar la historia 
mostraron más ítems correctos para información de acción, que el grupo control. Sin embargo, las cuatro 
condiciones no mostraron diferencias en la proporción de ítems de acción correctos recordados y la con-
fianza en su juicio. Sucintamente, el Experimento 1 mostró que las discusiones de testigos y volver a relatar 
los hechos vividos a otros mejora el recuerdo de la información de acción, pero tenía poco, o ningún, efecto 
en la precisión de la confianza de los juicios. El Experimento 2 analizó la precisión del recuerdo y de los 
juicios de la información de acción y detalle usando preguntas específicas. Setenta y siete participantes 
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Eyewitness testimony plays a central role in police investigative 
work and in later phases of the forensic process. However, eyewit-
nesses cannot always provide the required information, and many 
variables have been found to influence and bias performance 
(Blackwell-Young, 2008). Examples of such variables are the extent 
to which the witness has retold the event or discussed it with oth-
ers and what type of memory recall instructions are used by the 
forensic personnel. In addition, eyewitness error has been reported 
to be the main cause of faulty convictions (Wise, Pawlenko, Safer, & 
Mayer, 2009). Moreover, eyewitness’ confidence has been found to 
be the most influential factor when personnel in the forensic proc-
ess evaluate the correctness of eyewitness memory reports (Boyce, 
Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007), but witnesses’ confidence accuracy has 
commonly been found to be lacking (Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 
2005; Allwood, Innes-Ker, Homgren, & Fredin, 2008; Leippe & Ei-
senstadt, 2007). A possibility is that different parts of witness’ 
memory statements, such as information about actions and details, 
may differ with respect to their recall properties and their meta-
cognitive accuracy. If this is the case, having knowledge about such 
differences could help forensic personnel to make better use of wit-
nesses’ testimony. 
This study investigated whether action (what happened at the 
crime scene) or detail information (descriptions of persons, objects, 
time and place) is associated with better memory and confidence 
accuracy. Confidence accuracy refers to the match between a per-
son’s confidence judgments and the correctness of their answers 
(also called metacognitive realism). The study also investigated 
whether performance is influenced by repeated recall, by discussing 
the experienced event repeatedly, and finally, by the format of the 
questions asked. The two types of question formats used were: Open 
free recall, henceforth called free recall (Experiment 1) and focused 
questions (Experiment 1 and 2). It is of forensic relevance to under-
stand memory performance for action and detail information in free 
recall, as eyewitnesses’ early free recall can have an important influ-
ence on the subsequent course of the forensic investigation. Focused 
questions ask for specific information and are usually used as follow-
up questions to cover relevant aspects of the event that the witness 
did not mention in their free recall report.
Effects of Multiple Retelling and Discussions on Memory 
Performance
Witness’ memory performance is influenced by the fact that they 
retell their story multiple times, for example to the police and other 
personnel in the justice system and to their family and friends (Pa-
terson & Kemp, 2006; Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). Not only how 
many times a memory is shared (repetition) but also how an event is 
shared affect the memory of the event (Hyman, 1994; Marsh, 2007; 
Pasupathi, 2001), and may affect memory and confidence accuracy 
differently for different types of forensic information. 
Merely retelling an event can be considered the same as actively 
repeating the learned materials. Research shows that active repeti-
tion tends to improve memory performance in later recall, compared 
to the same amount of rehearsal based on reading the original mate-
rial (Karpicke & Roediger, 2007, 2008; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). 
Roediger and Karpicke called this the testing effect (Cull, 2000; Roe-
diger & Karpicke, 2006a, 2006b). 
In some cases, multiple retellings can hamper the retrieval of in-
formation because of retrieval induced forgetting (Coman, Manier, & 
Hirst, 2009; MacLeod, 2002). The retrieval induced forgetting effect 
is most likely to hold when information in the learned material is not 
well integrated. Thus, when the encoded content is well integrated 
there may be less or no retrieval induced forgetting (Anderson, 2003; 
Anderson & McCulloch, 1999). 
In general, action information has been found to be recalled bet-
ter than detail information (e.g., Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999). 
However, it can be speculated that, given the described properties of 
retrieval induced forgetting, the testing effect and the retrieval in-
duced forgetting effect may depend on the type of information being 
repeated. For action information, the testing effect may be more rel-
evant. The reason is that actions are often well integrated in the 
sense that retrieval of the first action is likely to act as a cue to the 
next action and so on. Detail information (i.e., descriptive details of 
individuals and things) may often be more loosely integrated. For 
example, the colour of hair may have only a very weak association 
with the colour of shirt. Consequently, retrieval induced forgetting 
may affect the memory of detail information (Coman et al., 2009) 
more than action information. The effects of multiple retellings were 
investigated in Experiment 1.
Discussing an event is different from merely retelling it since eye-
witness’ memory is often influenced by information supplied by 
their discussion partners. For example, co-witnesses discussing the 
event often engage in social interactions and cognitive work that re-
sult in a more common version of the event (e.g., Principe & Schinde-
wolf, 2012). This may decrease eyewitnesses’ memory performance 
(Nourkova, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2004; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). 
Consequently, how a witnessed event is retold (simply repeated or 
discussed), and if discussed, how, can affect the memory of the event 
in subsequent recalls (Hyman, 1994; Marsh, 2007; Skowronski & 
Walker, 2004). The effects of multiple discussions were also investi-
gated in Experiment 1.
Confidence Accuracy: Action vs. Detail Information
The results of previous research on confidence accuracy for 
action and detail information has not looked at free recall, but only 
at different types of focused questions (Ibabe & Sporer, 2004; 
Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999). Confidence ratings were given on a 
scale from 1 to 5 in both studies and neither study reported the 
relation between level of confidence and the proportion correct 
memory reports for different types of information. However, it can 
be deduced from Table 2 and 3 in Ibabe and Sporer’s (2004) 
reported results that their participants were somewhat better at 
separating correct from incorrect answers for detail information 
(.75) than for action information (.55). This is the slope-measure 
discussed below.
Free recall and focused questions differ in cognitive demand be-
cause focused questions test recognition memory and free recall test 
participants’ own-regulated recall (compare the memory report 
model presented by Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Consequently, par-
vieron una película, respondieron y juzgaron sesenta y tres preguntas sobre información de acción y de 
detalle en relación a los hechos. De nuevo, los participantes mostraron mejor memoria y confianza para la 
información de acción. En general, los resultados indican que, tanto para recuerdo libre como para pregun-
tas específicas, la precisión en recuerdo y confianza es mayor para la información de acción que para la in-
formación de detalle, por tanto, es necesario tomar precauciones en el sistema forense cuando tiene en 
consideración información de detalles proporcionada por testigos. 
© 2014 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. Todos los derechos reservados.  F. Sarwar et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 17-27  19
ticipants’ confidence accuracy may differ for action and detail infor-
mation depending on question type. 
Roberts and Higham (2002) investigated students’ memory per-
formance and confidence for central and peripheral information 
using the Cognitive interview (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & 
Holland, 1986). Initially, four police officers and one crown council 
were asked to identify events (what happened), people and 
weapon(s) in a criminal event (called relevant information for solv-
ing the case and here called central information). Other informa-
tion was seen as peripheral information. After context reinstate-
ment, the participants were interviewed in three phases: report of 
the event information in natural order, reverse order, and with 
changed perspective. Finally, in phase four, they answered focused 
questions. When analyzing confidence accuracy, Roberts and 
Higham (2002) collapsed the data for the four phases in the inter-
view. Therefore it is not clear which types of recall cause the effects 
with respect to confidence accuracy. 
Repeated post-event questioning may cause increased confidence 
without a corresponding change in memory performance. One rea-
son for this could be that the ease of information retrieval, also called 
retrieval fluency, may increase confidence (Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). 
Fluency has been reported to increase with repeated retrievals of the 
same information (Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 1996; Shaw, Mc-
Clure, & Dykstra, 2007). This increase in retrieval fluency may affect 
detail information more than action information because detail in-
formation may be less well integrated than action information. In 
brief, when less well-integrated information is recalled multiple 
times it will be easier to retrieve and will therefore be associated 
with higher retrieval fluency, which in turn may increase confidence. 
Also, the content and nature of discussions are relevant for confi-
dence accuracy because they may influence memory performance. 
For example, discussing an event with friends and partners may re-
sult in better memory compared to discussing the same event with 
unknown people (Andersson & Rönnberg, 1995). 
Calibration methodology was used in the present research since it 
gives a more differentiated and informative understanding of confi-
dence accuracy compared to simply computing the correlation be-
tween confidence and correctness of the memory report, which is 
the traditional measure in lineup research (Allwood, 2010; Brewer, 
2006; Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Weingardt, Leonesio, & Lof-
tus, 1994; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002). 
The present study consists of two experiments. Experiment 1 was a 
part of a larger project and the overall findings of participants’ perform-
ance have been reported elsewhere (Sarwar, Allwood, & Innes-Ker, 2011).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 focused on participants’ memory and confidence 
accuracy for action and detail information using free recall and fo-
cused questions. Participants first watched a short film about a kid-
napping then were separated into four conditions. After three 
weeks, their memory for events in the film was tested, and 3 to 4 
days later participants gave confidence judgments of their recall. 
The four conditions were: Lab-discussion, Family discussion, Retell 
and Control. In the first three of these conditions the participants 
retold and discussed the witnessed event 5 times with an unfamil-
iar person;  retold and discussed the witnessed event with their 
family and friends; only retold the witnessed event to a person, 
respectively. In the Control condition the participants neither re-
told nor discussed the event.
The Lab-discussion condition can be seen as the critical condition. 
However, due to the very controlled nature of this condition, the 
Family discussion condition was created to increase the ecological 
validity and reduce the impact of strict lab conditions. To tap the ef-
fects of discussion, the Retell condition was introduced to control for 
the effects of merely retelling the event.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Proportion correct of all recalled information, and 
confidence accuracy were predicted to be better for action informa-
tion than for detail information. The reasoning was that people in 
general are better at describing actions than describing details 
(Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999). Consequently, not only the memory 
of action information will be better but the better memory is also 
likely to improve the confidence accuracy. 
Hypothesis 2. For action information, the participants in the Lab- 
and Family discussion conditions were expected to report a lower 
proportion of correct pieces of information and have poorer calibra-
tion than participants in the Retell condition. The reason is that the 
exchange of information in the two discussion conditions can be ex-
pected to introduce new information that may be confused by the 
participants for information from the original event (Nourkova et al., 
2004; Wright et al., 2000). In contrast, participants in the Retell con-
dition were expected to benefit because of the testing effect (Roedi-
ger & Karpicke, 2006a). The confidence of the participants in the two 
discussion conditions would be inflated due to increase in retrieval 
fluency (Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 1996) caused by the post-
event discussions in addition to the increase in fluency that may 
have taken place as an effect of the mere retelling in all three ex-
perimental conditions. Consequently, participants in the two discus-
sion conditions were expected to show poorer confidence accuracy 
than those in the Retell condition on the confidence accuracy meas-
ures that focus on the relation between proportion correct and con-
fidence (i.e., calibration and over-/underconfidence). Thus, the par-
ticipants in the Retell condition were expected to show a higher 
proportion correct and to show better results on the calibration 
measures for action information than the participants in the discus-
sion conditions. 
Hypothesis 3. For detail information, participants in the Retell 
condition was expected to show better results than the Control con-
dition on the two confidence accuracy measures that involve differ-
ence between the confidence level and proportion correct (i.e., cali-
bration and over-/underconfidence). All four conditions were 
expected to show a somewhat low proportion correct, since the par-
ticipants’ memory for detail information has been consistently found 
to be weak in previous research (e.g. Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999; 
Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). This would leave space for a beneficial rep-
etition effect to be pertinent for the detail information in the three 
experimental conditions. At the same time, the level of proportion 
correct was expected to be somewhat dampened for the two discus-
sion conditions due to that the participants in these conditions might 
mix up the discussion partner’s contributions with information from 
the witnessed event. An increase for confidence due to repetition 
(especially in the discussion conditions) was also expected, but this 
increase was not expected to be as large as for proportion correct. 
Put together, this lead to an expectation of a higher proportion cor-
rect and somewhat inflated confidence for the Retell condition and 
as an effect of this better calibration and less over-/underconfidence 
than for the Control condition, with the participants in the two dis-
cussion conditions performing in between the other two conditions. 
In the Results section, both number of items and number of correct 
items are analyzed, as those results add to the understanding of 
memory performance, but no predictions about those results were 
made.
Method
Participants
The participants were 89 students (62 women) from Lund Univer-
sity, Sweden, with the mean age of 25 (18-47 years). At first, 92 par-
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each condition. The dropouts from the Lab-discussion condition, 
Family discussion condition, the Retell and the Control condition 
were 7, 6, 4, and 1 respectively. Dropouts during the study were all 
replaced except for the three who dropped out at the end. Partici-
pants who successfully completed the experiment received a movie 
ticket worth 90 SEK (approximately 9€).
Design
The experiment conformed to a 4 X 3 mixed design. The between-
subjects factor was the condition type: Lab-discussion (n = 21; one 
participant only attended 4 out of 5 sessions), Family discussion (n = 
23), Retell (n  = 23) and Control condition (n = 22). The within-
subjects factor was the information type: action information and 
detail information. In addition, as described below, information 
about surroundings, etc. that can be seen as non-forensic was 
separated out.
Materials
Videotape.  The witnessed event was a film about two men 
kidnapping a woman from a bus stop. The film was 3 min and 50 s 
long and was shown on a 28-inch color television. This film has been 
used in previous research (Allwood, Ask, & Granhag, 2005; Granhag, 
1997).
Focused questions about the film. The questionnaire consisted of 
44 questions about the film. The questionnaire was found productive 
and valid for the purpose of the study in previous research (Allwood, 
Innes-Ker, Homgren, & Fredin, 2008; Allwood, Jonsson, & Granhag, 
2005). Each question had one correct and one incorrect answer 
alternative. The questions were about different details of the people’s 
appearance, clothes, ages, as well as the surrounding environment 
such as letter boxes, cars, busses, and, specifically, the offenders’ car. 
Some example questions were: His/her hair color was ---- (A. red; B. 
blond). How old was he/she ---- (A. 21 – 30 years; B. 31 – 40 years). 
What was the colour of the car ---- (A. blue; B. white). 
Confidence judgment scales. An 11-point scale was used for the 
participants’ judgments of the detailed parts of the free recalls. This 
scale started at 0% (“Completely sure that I remember wrong”) and 
increased in steps by 10 (10, 20, 30 …) to 100% (“Completely sure 
that I remember correct”). This scale was inserted below each 
recalled item to be confidence judged. A 6-point scale was also used 
for participants’ judgments of their answers to the 44 focused 
questions about the film. As the probability to randomly choose the 
right answer was 50%, the confidence scale ranged from 50% 
(“Guessing”), in steps by ten, to 100% (“Completely sure”).
Procedure.  The participants were received in the lab in small 
groups of between 4 to 8 individuals. They were told: “We are 
investigating human perception in different forensic situations”. 
First, participants watched the video film, and then they were 
randomized to one of the four conditions. Participants in the three 
experimental conditions received a time schedule for the five 
occasions over a 20-day period when they would retell the film.
In each of the five sessions, the participants in the Lab-discussion 
and Retell conditions visited the laboratory. Participants in the Lab-
discussion condition discussed the events in the film with a 
confederate. The confederate asked spontaneous questions about 
the film after listening to the story of the film. One-hundred and 
five confederates were recruited solely for the discussion purpose, 
and each confederate participated only in one discussion. The 
participants in the Retell condition simply told the story about the 
film to the experimenter. Participants were instructed to tell 
whatever they remembered about the film. The experimenter 
posed no questions to the participants. All discussions and retellings 
were recorded on a MP3 recorder. Participants in the Family 
discussion condition did five discussions at home with their family 
or friends, each time with a new individual. The participants carried 
out their discussions on the scheduled dates and times. Further, 
participants confirmed their discussions to the experimenter by 
7:00 pm by sending an SMS (Short Message Service). If any 
participant failed to send the SMS by 7:00 pm on the discussion 
day, the experimenter called the participant and reminded him/her 
of the task. In the Control condition, participants were instructed to 
not tell the contents of the film to anybody.
All participants returned to the lab on the 21st day for a memory 
test. The participants first typed whatever they remembered about 
the events they witnessed in the film (free recall test) and then 
answered 44 focused questions. 
Finally, all participants returned to the laboratory on the 24th or 
25th day to give their confidence judgments. First, participants gave 
their confidence judgments about their free recall items (which had 
been prepared as described below). Second, the participants gave 
their confidence judgments for the 44 focused questions.
Preparation of Material for Participants’ Confidence Judgments
In order to record participants’ confidence judgments for each 
piece of information, each participant’s free recall was broken down 
into single pieces of information using the method described by 
Allwood, Ask and Granhag (2005). The principles followed were: (1) 
items about actors and actions carried out were considered a single 
piece of information. For example “the woman looked at the timetable” 
was considered as a single piece. (2) An object with one associated 
characteristic was considered as one piece. For example “the yellow 
letterbox” was considered as a single piece. (3) If an object was 
associated with more than one characteristic, the additional 
characteristics were regarded as separate pieces of information. For 
example “the bald old guy” was considered as two pieces. To help 
participants recall the context in which they mentioned each piece of 
information, one or two sentences adjacent to that piece were 
attached. These reference items were enclosed in brackets while the 
items to be confidence judged were underlined. Finally, an 11-point 
confidence scale was placed under each piece of information. 
Division of Memory Reports into Forensic and Non-forensic 
Subcategories
In preparation for the ensuing analyses, participants’ memory 
reports were classified into different information categories in two 
steps. In the first step, to separate out the irrelevant information, 
participants’ statements were divided into forensic and non-forensic 
items. Information such as houses, roads, surroundings, etc., was 
seen as non-forensic because it is either not needed to solve the 
crime or can be collected from the crime scene without the help of 
an eyewitness. 
In the second step, the forensic items were divided into action 
and detail categories by following the plot relevancy model by Heuer 
and Reisberg (1990). In this model, information or facts related to the 
story (actions involved in the event) that cannot be changed without 
changing the story are regarded as central (e.g., the suspect put a gun 
to the victim’s head) and other information (detail information) as 
peripheral.
Inter-Judge Reliability. One coder divided all the participants’ 
memory reports into action, detail, and non-forensic categories. In 
order to check the reliability of coding done by the first coder a 
second coder coded the 10% of the cases into the three categories. 
Inter-rater reliability was calculated from the 10% of the cases coded 
by the two coders using Cohen’s Kappa. The resulting Cohen’s Kappa 
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Measurements
The five dependent measures used were proportion correct, 
confidence, calibration, over-/underconfidence and slope. Proportion 
correct is simply the number of correct items divided by the total 
number of reported items of the kind considered (e.g., all items, or all 
action items). Calibration, over-/underconfidence and slope are used 
to measure the confidence accuracy and are calculated from the 
scores for proportion correct and confidence. Calibration and over-/
underconfidence measure the relationship between a person’s level of 
confidence and proportion correct. Calibration compares a person’s 
proportion correct and the corresponding confidence for each 
confidence level and represents the person’s squared deviance from 
perfect calibration at all confidence levels (depending on the type of 
confidence scale used, e.g., 50, 60, 70, … ). Over-/underconfidence is 
the difference between the person’s average confidence and his/her 
percentage of correct items. The value zero represents perfect 
confidence accuracy for both calibration and over-/underconfidence. 
For the over-/underconfidence measure, positive and negative values 
show overconfidence and underconfidence respectively. Slope is a 
measure of the person’s ability to separate his/her correct and 
incorrect answers by means of the level of his/her confidence 
judgments. It is computed by subtracting the person’s mean 
confidence level for incorrect items from the mean confidence level 
of the correct items. Yates (1994) provided the specific formula for 
calibration and a more thorough discussion of these measures.
Results
Free recall
First the analyses for the number of recalled items of the different 
types (i.e., action, detail, and non-forensic items), and the total 
number of correct recalled items for each information type and for 
each condition are presented. Next follows the analyses pertaining to 
the three hypotheses, and finally the results for the focused questions 
are presented. 
Number of Recalled Items by Category and Condition
The total amount of items reported (both correct and incorrect) 
indicates whether the different conditions affected the quantity of 
information volunteered. All items reported were submitted to a 4 
X 3 mixed ANOVA in line with previous research (e.g., Migueles & 
García-Bajos, 1999; Wessel & Merckelbach, 1997) and since no 
other alternative was feasible. The between-subjects factor was 
condition (Lab-discussion, Family discussion, Retell and Control 
condition) and the within-subject factor was information type 
(action, detail, and non-forensic). The means and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 1.
The results showed that there was a significant main effect of in-
formation type, Wilks’ Lambda = .19, F(2, 84) = 178.3, p < .001; η2 = 
.62. Contrasts with Bonferroni corrected significance levels revealed 
that action items were reported significantly more often than detail 
items F(1, 85) = 185.3, p < .001: η2 = .65, and non-forensic items, 
F(1, 85) = 328.2, p < .001; η2 = .77.
There was also a significant main effect of the four conditions, F(3, 
85) = 6.34, p < .001; η2 = .18. Contrasts for the four conditions and the 
type of information with Bonferroni corrected significance levels 
revealed for action information that the Lab-discussion condition, 
t(41) = 1.90, p < .001; Cohen’s d = 1.5, the Retell condition, t(43) = 3.84, 
p < .001; Cohen’s d = 1.2, and the Family discussion condition, 
t(43) = 2.75, p < .01; Cohen’s d = .83, reported significantly more 
items as compared to the Control condition. No differences between 
the conditions were found for detail and non-forensic information. 
The results also showed that there was a significant interaction 
effect for condition and information type, Wilks’ Lambda = .83, F(2, 86) 
= 2.74, p < .01; η2 = .04. Inspecting the means in Table 1, it is unclear 
what is driving this interaction, as the discussion type seems to have 
differential impact on what type of information is recalled. It does 
appear that the variation between conditions for action items recalled 
is larger than for the two other types of information. To further probe 
the data for simple effects is unlikely to yield reliable insights.
Number of Correct Items for Different Kinds of Information
The number of correct items is an indicator of the quality of the 
recalled information. A 4 X 3 mixed ANOVA with a similar construc-
tion as above was conducted. The number of correct items is shown 
in Table 1.
The results showed that there was a significant main effect of in-
formation type, Wilks’ Lambda = .19, F(2, 80) = 170.9, p < .001; η2 = .69. 
Contrasts with Bonferroni corrected significance levels revealed that 
significantly more correct action items were recalled as compared to 
the detail items F(1, 81) = 293.04, p < .001; η2 = .75, and the non-fo-
rensic items, F(1, 81) = 260.5, p < .001; η2 = .74. The contrasts also 
revealed that the number of correct non-forensic items was also sig-
nificantly higher than the number of correct detail items, F(1, 81) = 
11.91, p < .001; η2 = .12.
There was also a significant main effect of condition, F(3, 81) = 
6.45,  p < .001; η2 = .19. Contrasts with Bonferroni corrected 
significance levels revealed that the participants in the Lab-
discussion condition, t(41) = 4.52, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.4, and Retell 
condition, t(43) = 3.62, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.1, recalled a significantly 
higher number of correct items than the participants in the Control 
condition. Further contrasts for each type of information revealed 
that the participants in the Lab-discussion recalled significantly 
more correct items than the Control condition for action information, 
t(41) = 5.16, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.6, and non-forensic information, 
t(39) = 2.33, p < .03, Cohen’s d = 0.75. The participants in the Retell 
Table 1
Experiment 1: Results for the Free Recall. Mean Number of Items and Number of Correct Recalled Items for Different Types of Information for the Four Conditions
Lab-discussion M(SD) Family discussion M(SD) Retell M(SD) Control M(SD)
Mean number of items
Action information 31.24(8.3) 25.83(9.0) 28.48(8.9) 18.86(7.9)
Detail information 13.81(8.5) 10.56(9.6) 7.13(6.7) 9.23(7.3)
Non-forensic 12.71(7.5) 10.69(7.6) 10.34(8.2) 7.40(5.2)
Correct items
Action information   27.43(7.9) 22.00(8.2) 26.95(8.8) 16.75(6.3)
Detail information 8.52(5.5) 6.52(6.4) 4.71(4.9) 5.50(5.2)
Non-forensic 10.81(6.9) 8.91(6.1) 10.30(6.7) 6.75(3.6)22  F. Sarwar et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 17-27
condition also recalled significantly more correct items than the 
participants in the Control condition for action information, 
t(43) = 4.63, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.4, and the non-forensic information, 
t(39) = 2.10, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.67.
The results showed that there was a significant interaction effect 
for condition and information type, Wilks’ Lambda = .82, F(2, 80) = 2.88, 
p < .01; η2 = .04. As with the analysis of the total number of items 
recalled, the interaction appears to have complex reasons. Inspection 
of the means again suggest that the variation between discussion 
conditions for action items recalled was larger than for the other two 
types.
Confidence Accuracy: Calibration Curves
Figure 1 shows the calibration curves for the free recall for action, 
detail, and non-forensic information for all participants. The x-axis 
shows the confidence levels (from 0 to 100%) and the y-axis shows 
the percent of correct answers. The numbers inside the graph give 
the percent of answers for each confidence level in each condition. 
The diagonal shows perfect calibration. As can be seen in the Figure, 
the calibration curves for the action, detail, and non-forensic 
information show very low percentages for the confidence scores 
between 0 and 50. Consequently, these levels will not be further 
discussed. For confidence scores 50 and above, the scores for action 
and non-forensic information are clustered close to the diagonal, 
indicating that confidence is fairly accurate for these two types of 
information. For detail information, the calibration curve shows 
overconfidence from 60% to 100% confidence. In addition, for both 
action and non-forensic information, about half of the confidence 
judgments are at the 100% level. For detail information, the 
confidence judgments are fairly evenly distributed between 50% and 
100%. For all information types the participants show some 
overconfidence at the 100% confidence level. 
Proportion Correct, Confidence, and Confidence Accuracy for Action, 
Detail and Non-forensic Information and for the Four Conditions
The next set of analyses addressed the three main hypotheses. To 
compare the participants’ performance in the four conditions for the 
three information types, the data were subjected to 4x3 mixed 
ANOVAs, separately for proportion correct, confidence, calibration, 
over-/underconfidence, and slope. The means and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 2.
Proportion correct of all recalled items. The results showed a 
significant main effect of information type, Wilks’ Lambda = .43, F(2, 
66) = 43.56, p < .001; η2 = .50. Contrasts with Bonferroni corrected 
significance levels revealed that the participants reported a 
significantly higher proportion correct of action information than 
detail information F(1, 67) = 73.52, p < .001; η2 = .25. The participants 
also a reported higher proportion correct for non-forensic information 
than detail information, F(1, 67) = 85.68, p < .001; η2 = .30. There was 
no main effect of condition, and no interaction effect was found.
Confidence. The results showed a significant main effect for 
confidence for information type, Wilks’ Lambda = .43, F(2, 66) = 44.64, 
p < .001; h2 = .46. Contrasts with Bonferroni corrected significance 
levels revealed that the participants were significantly more 
confident for action information than detail information 
F(1, 67) = 79.60, p < .001; h2 = .25. The participants were also more 
confident for the non-forensic information as compared to the detail 
information, F(1, 67) = 75.64, p < .001; η2 = .28. There was no main 
effect of condition, and no interaction effect was found.
Calibration. The results showed a significant main effect for 
calibration for information type, Wilks’ Lambda = .65, F(2, 83) = 22.02, 
p < .001; η2 = .27. Contrasts with Bonferroni corrected significance 
levels revealed that the participants were significantly better 
calibrated for action information than detail information F(1, 84) = 
44.15, p < .001; η2 = .16. The participants were also better calibrated 
for non-forensic information as compared to detail information, F(1, 
84) = 29.04, p < .001; η2 = .14. There was no main effect of condition, 
and no interaction effect was found.
Over-/underconfidence. The results showed a significant main 
effect for over-/underconfidence for information type, Wilks’ Lambda 
= .75, F(2, 83) = 14, p < .001; η2 = .19. Contrasts with Bonferroni 
corrected significance levels revealed that the participants showed 
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significantly less over-/underconfidence for action information than 
for detail information F(1, 84) = 26.22, p < .001; η2 = .12. The 
participants also showed less over-/underconfidence for non-forensic 
information as compared to detail information, F(1, 84) = 24.18, p < .001; 
η2 = .11. There was no main effect of condition, and no interaction 
effect was found.
Slope. There was no significant difference for slope between the 
three types of information. 
The Focused Questions
Separate between-subjects one-way ANOVAS were conducted for 
each of the dependent measures for the focused questions (see Table 
3). There were no significant effects for any of the measures.
Discussion
The results for the free recall showed that participants performed 
significantly better for action information as compared to detail and 
non-forensic information on the mean number of items and correct 
items reported in each information category. The participants’ better 
performance for action information is in line with previous research 
(Roebers, Moga, & Schneider, 2001). The lower number of detail 
items could, at least partly, be due to repetition. Hershkowitz and 
Terner (2007) found that in the second recall attempt, participants 
recalled less detail information than in the first attempt. It is difficult 
to say whether the low number of detail items recalled in Experiment 
1 was due to the multiple recall attempts or because of the other 
factors that might have influenced the memory of detail information 
during the time between watching the event and final recall. A 
partial explanation for the lower number of non-forensic information 
units may be that participants exert control over what to share on 
the basis of their understanding of what is expected of them (Grice, 
1975; Russell & Schober, 1999). Consequently, the participants may 
only have shared such information that they considered relevant to 
the forensic event.
There were also differences between the conditions for the 
different types of information. Participants in the Retell and the Lab-
discussion conditions benefited from the retellings and discussions 
Table 2
Experiment 1: Results for the Free Recall. Action, Detail, and Non-forensic Information: Means (and SDs) for Proportion Correct, Confidence, Calibration, Over-/underconfidence 
and Slope
Lab-discussion M(SD) Family discussion M(SD) Retell M(SD) Control M(SD)
Proportion correct 
Action information 87.60(10.1) 84.20(10.0) 92.56(5.2) 85.10(12.9)
Detail information 61.10(21.2) 63.91(22.0) 68.15(25.9) 57.38(27.9)
Non-forensic 86.15(13.8) 91.32(11.3) 93.84(6.8) 86.18(13.1)
Confidence 
Action information 87.96(6.7) 90.45(5.9) 90.17(4.9) 86.86(7.7)
Detail information 75.71(10.4) 80.60(12.1) 80.44(7.2) 73.73(12.8)
Non-forensic 89.76(6.8) 91.43(8.3) 90.53(7.1) 86.57(11.9)
Calibration 
Action information 0.04(.03) 0.05(.03) 0.03(.02) 0.05(.03)
Detail information 0.11(.09) 0.12(.11) 0.11(.12) 0.12(.10)
Non-forensic 0.05(.05) 0.05(.07) 0.02(.02) 0.06(.06)
O/U confidence
Action information 0.00(0.10) 0.05(0.11) -0.02(0.07) 0.01(0.13)
Detail information 0.14(0.19) 0.16(0.24) 0.12(0.26) 0.16(0.22)
Non-forensic 0.03(0.14) 0.01(0.13) -0.03(0.08) 0.02(0.16)
Slope 
Action information 8.11(9.9) 16.63(14.9) 0.04(8.2) 7.10(7.8)
Detail information 7.15(9.2) 7.27(13.1) 11.25(6.1) 13.88(14.7)
Non-forensic 10.79(16.0) 10.63(18.3) 21.98(11.9) 11.64(7.9)
Note. O/U confidence = Over-/underconfidence
Table 3
Experiment 1: Results for Focused Questions. Means (and SDs) for Proportion Correct, Confidence, Calibration, Over-/underconfidence and Slope
Lab-discussion M(SD) Family discussion M(SD) Rehearsal M(SD) Control F η2
Proportion correct 53.68(6.68) 55.34(7.14) 56.13(5.83) 54.03(6.54) 0.67 .02
Confidence 62.97(4.45) 65.55(6.76) 64.33(6.97) 62.28(5.57) 1.29 .04
Calibration 0.05(0.02) 0.05(.03) 0.05(0.02) .05(.03) 0.32 .01
O/U confidence 0.09(0.08) 0.10(.08) 0.08(0.07) .08(.09) 0.33 .01
Slope 4.02(4.37) 3.50(4.94) 4.22(5.73) 3.64(5.46) 0.09 .00
Note. O/U confidence = Over-/underconfidence24  F. Sarwar et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 17-27
respectively; they reported significantly more action items as 
compared to the Control condition. However, there was no similar 
benefit for either the number of detail items or correct detail items. 
The first hypothesis expected that the participants’ would have a 
higher proportion correct and better confidence accuracy for action 
information than detail information. The results indeed showed that 
participants had higher proportion correct, higher confidence, better 
calibration, and over-/underconfidence for action information as 
compared to detail information. However, the slope measure did not 
differ between the information types. 
Participants’ superior performance for action information over 
detail information is in line with the previous findings where focused 
questions were used for analyzing confidence accuracy (Ibabe & 
Sporer, 2004; Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999). Note the large effect 
sizes indicating a strong effect of information type. The present 
findings for confidence accuracy extend the previous findings to 
eyewitness’ free recall. The results for the measures of confidence 
accuracy further add to our knowledge in that the participants showed 
very good confidence accuracy for the measures that relate the 
participants’ level of confidence to their proportion correct (i.e., the 
calibration and over-/underconfidence measures) for action 
information but not equally impressive results for these measures for 
detail information. Interestingly, the results for the slope measure 
showed that participants’ ability to discriminate between correct and 
incorrect responses did not differ for action and detail information. 
According to the second hypothesis, participants in the two 
discussion conditions were expected to report a lower proportion 
correct and to show poorer confidence accuracy for action 
information than the participants in Retell condition. The results did 
not support this hypothesis in that no difference were found between 
the conditions for proportion correct, confidence, calibration, over-/
underconfidence, and slope. This result should be taken with caution 
because the mixed ANOVA is a bit stringent, and it excluded those 
participants from the analysis who did not report either type of 
information. Consequently, the ANOVA results presented were based 
on 71 participants (total N = 89). This lowered the power of the 
analysis. This issue should be explored further in future research 
with a different design and with more participants. 
The results did not support the third hypothesis that for detail 
information, participants in the Retell condition would show better 
confidence accuracy than the Control condition. The reason may be 
that the standard deviations were large for the proportion correct for 
detail information as evidenced when comparing with action 
information. 
The performance on the 44 focused questions was overall poor, 
and also, there were no differences between conditions. One possible 
reason is that the focused questions were only about detail 
information. Since there were no differences between the conditions 
for the detail information in the free recall, findings for focused 
questions further strengthen the free recall results that detail 
information is difficult to remember accurately. 
Experiment 2
The testing part of Experiment 1 was designed to follow the 
standard police procedure of interviewing the witnesses. The 
Participants first did a free recall and then answered the focused 
questions. These questions were only about detail information; hence 
it was not possible to compare the participants’ performance for 
action and detail information for the focused questions. To further 
explore this issue a follow-up experiment was conducted. Given that 
the results for the focused questions did not differ between the four 
conditions, the different conditions of Experiment 1 were not included 
in Experiment 2. Just as in Experiment 1it is predicted that the 
proportion correct of all recalled information, and confidence accuracy 
would be better for action information than for detail information.
Method
Participants
Seventy-seven students from Lund University participated. The 
mean age of the participants was 26.5 years, ranging from 20 to 65 
years. Each participant was given a lottery ticket worth 25 SEK 
(approximately € 2.5).
Design
A within-subject design was used. The within-subject factor was 
the two types of focused questions used: questions on action and 
detail information.
Materials
Videotape. The same video was used as in Experiment 1. 
Focused questions about the film. The questionnaire consisted of 
63 questions about the film. Eighteen questions were about action 
information of the events shown in the film. Forty-five questions 
were about details of the events. The different number of questions 
in the two categories is due to that there was more detail than action 
information in the film. Questions were arranged in the order events 
happened in the film. Each question had three alternative answers 
where one was always correct. The greater number of options was 
chosen to lower the guessing level as compared to the two options 
used in the 44 focused questions in Experiment 1. The position of the 
correct answer was randomized for the questions.
Confidence judgment scale. An 11-point confidence scale from 0% 
(“Completely sure that I remember wrong”) to 100% (“Completely 
sure that I remember correct”) confidence was used. This scale was 
placed under each question.
Procedure
The participants first watched the film. In order to avoid covert 
rehearsal, participants then read a one and half page long article in 
English as a filler task for 10 minutes. Next, participants answered 
the questionnaire and made a confidence judgment immediately 
after answering each question. 
Results
Calibration Curves
Figure 2 shows the calibration curves for action and detail 
information. Action information shows low percentages of items for 
the respective confidence levels between 0 and 60. The calibration 
curve for detail information shows that the number of items at each 
confidence level is fairly equally spread from the 0% level to the 90% 
level. The graph suggests that participants were relatively well 
calibrated for action information compared to detail information. 
The calibration curve for detail information is fairly flat. This shows 
that participants had difficulty in separating correct from incorrect 
answers by means of their confidence judgments. 
Proportion Correct, Confidence, Over-/underconfidence, and Slope
Paired sample t-tests were conducted to compare the participants’ 
scores for proportion correct, confidence, calibration, over-/
underconfidence, and slope for action and detail information (Table 
4). Participants showed significantly higher proportions correct,   F. Sarwar et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 17-27  25
t(76) = 16.46, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.19, confidence, t(76) = 25.13, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.36, better calibration, t (76) = -3.06, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = -0.55, and steeper positive slope, t(76) = 2.73, p < .008, 
Cohen’s d = .39, for action information than for detail information. In 
contrast, participants showed less overconfidence, t(76) = 3.96, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = .40, for detail information as compared to action 
information.
Discussion
Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate if participants would 
show better memory performance and confidence accuracy for action 
information as compared to detail information for focused questions. 
The results showed that the participants reported higher proportion 
correct, higher confidence, had better calibration, and larger slope for 
action information. In contrast, participants showed less over-/
underconfidence for detail information as compared with action 
information. The results for proportion correct and confidence were in 
line with previous studies, using open-ended questions (Yuille & 
Cutshall, 1986), focused questions (Parker & Carranza, 1989), and both 
focused (2 and 4 answer alternatives) and open-ended questions 
(Ibabe & Sporer, 2004), that show people are better at remembering 
central information as compared to peripheral information. 
As noted, the results showed that the participants showed less 
overconfidence for detail information than for action information. 
This result was unexpected because the participants could be ex-
pected to show less overconfidence for action information due to 
better memory for this type of information. However, this result can 
be explained by looking at the calibration curves in Figure 2. Here it 
can be seen that the action items are, on average, closer to the diago-
nal (indicating perfect confidence accuracy) than the detail items. 
This conclusion remains also when the percentages of the items at 
each confidence level are weighted in. The good result for the over-/
underconfidence measure for the detail items may be due to the un-
derconfidence found for confidence classes below 50% being “com-
pensated” by the overconfidence found for the confidence classes 
above 50%, giving an aggregate result of 0.00 for the peripheral 
items. 
Parenthetically, it should also be noted that the participants used 
the confidence class 0 (ostensibly meaning “absolutely certain I’m 
wrong”) for 14% of the detail items whereas their performance for 
these items was at chance level. The explanation for this is not clear, 
except that the detail items were in general fairly difficult and may 
have appeared so for the participants. The participants appear not to 
have considered that they could expect to have about one-third of 
the items correct just by chance. In total, in the over-/underconfi-
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Table 4
Experiment 2: Means (and SDs) for Proportion Correct, Confidence, Calibration, Over-/underconfidence and Slope
Action information M(SD) Detail information M(SD) t Cohen’s d
Proportion correct 72.01(11.05) 51.60(7.25) 16.46* 2.18
Confidence 76.97(10.27) 51.41(11.49) 25.13* 2.34
Calibration 0.09(0.05) 0.12(0.06) -3.06* -0.54
O/U confidence 0.05(0.12) 0.00(0.13) 3.96* 0.40
Slope 20.79(15.60) 15.50(11.61) 2.73* 0.38
Note. O/U confidence = Over-/underconfidence; *p < .01.26  F. Sarwar et al. / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 6 (2014) 17-27
dence measure, these two tendencies (under- and overconfidence at 
the different halves of the scale) balance out. In general, the results 
quite clearly indicate poorer confidence accuracy for detail questions 
over action questions when the calibration and slope measures are 
also considered. In line with this, the participants showed greater 
overconfidence for detail items than for action items for all confi-
dence levels above 50%. 
Responses to all focused questions, aggregated across both action 
and detail questions, showed lower levels of overconfidence than has 
been observed in previous research (e.g Allwood et al., 2008; All-
wood, Knutsson, & Granhag, 2006). A possible reason might be that 
the three answer alternatives may have induced more uncertainty 
(Robinson, Johnson, & Robertson, 2000), especially for the more dif-
ficult questions (i.e., the questions on details). 
General Discussion
This research investigated eyewitness’ capacity to correctly report 
and give confidence judgments with good confidence accuracy of 
their recall of action and detail information. The issue was investi-
gated using eyewitness’ free recall reports and their answers to fo-
cused questions. For the free recall, non-forensic information was 
also analyzed.
The results for the free recall showed that the number of items 
reported and the number of correct items reported was higher for 
action information than for detail and non-forensic information, 
whereas participants had a higher proportion correct both for action 
and non-forensic information than for detail information. These re-
sults are in line with the previous findings that the participants re-
ported more items for action information (Jelicic et al., 2006; Yuille 
& Cutshall, 1986) and had a higher proportion correct (Ibabe & Spor-
er, 2004; Migueles & Garcia-Bajos, 1999) than for detail information. 
This suggests that people can describe the time-course of an event in 
a forensic situation quite well, whereas descriptions of individuals 
and objects suffer in accuracy comparatively. One possible reason for 
these results can be that it is not only the motion per se that draws 
attention. Rather, the onset of motion would draw attention if it 
causes regrouping and new interpretation of the scene (Abrams & 
Christ, 2003; Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994). In case of a forensic event, 
actions or movements of different people and things would cause a 
continuous regrouping and reinterpretation of the whole scene over 
the period of time the crime happens. Thus, the witness’ attention is 
likely to switch between the different actions initiated by the actors 
to interpret the situation in the light of the regrouping of the stimu-
li. Although a blue shirt that moves would display a moving color it 
would not usually signal a motion onset with a regrouping effect. 
Considering that attention is a limited resource, it is consequently 
likely that attention used to interpret the regrouping of the situation 
makes the eyewitnesses unintentionally blind to detail information. 
Hence, the police need to be more careful when taking into account 
the description of the offender provided by an eyewitness compared 
with the witness’ description of the action information of the event. 
This issue needs further research. Such research could use a 
methodology that study eyewitness gaze behavior during a real time 
event similar to a forensic event. Use of eye tracking device is a pos-
sible option to study such behavior.
The results for the confidence accuracy measures for the free re-
call show that confidence accuracy for action information (in con-
trast to detail information) can be fairly good. These results indicate 
that confidence may be seen as a fairly reliable indicator of propor-
tion correct for action information in witnesses’ free recall. 
This research also addressed the impact of retellings, discussions, 
and the type of memory question on the memory and confidence 
accuracy of different types of information. The results showed that 
the participants in the two discussion conditions reported signifi-
cantly more action information than the participants in the Control 
condition. However, the four conditions did not differ in terms of 
proportion correct, confidence, calibration, and over-/underconfi-
dence and slope. These results are relevant for the courts’ decision 
making since courts place more trust on eyewitnesses who provide 
more information than eyewitnesses who provide less information 
(Bell & Loftus, 1988; Heath, Grannemann, Sawa, & Hodge, 1997). This 
suggests that courts need to be careful when using the amount of 
information reported as a criterion for the credibility of an eyewit-
ness.
The results showed no difference between the participants’ per-
formance in the four conditions for detail information. However, a 
limitation of the results concerning the free recall in this study was 
the frequency of detail information recalled was quite low. For this 
reason, differential effects of discussion or repetition on the propor-
tion correct and confidence accuracy for detail information should 
be investigated in future research using bigger samples so as to get 
more stable results.
The results for focused questions from the two experiments are in 
line with other empirical findings using the Plot relevancy model 
showing that people, in general, are better at remembering action 
information (Hershkowitz & Terner, 2007; Roebers & Schneider, 
2000; Yuille & Cutshall, 1986) than detail information. 
The results for the focused questions from Experiment 2 indicate 
that people also show better confidence accuracy for action informa-
tion over detail information. An exception to this was that the par-
ticipants showed no overconfidence for detail information but as 
discussed above this result appears to be because the underconfi-
dence for items with confidence under 50% was “compensated” by 
the overconfidence for the items with confidence over 50%. The spe-
cific reason for this pattern is not clear and should be investigated in 
future research. 
In brief, the results indicate that although repeated retellings and 
discussions risk introducing specific errors into the testimony, the 
overall effect of these activities seen in this study for free recall was 
positive for memory but not very noticeable for confidence accuracy 
performance for action information. In contrast, there was, overall, 
less effect for detail information. When, as often may be the case, 
focused questions concern detail information, the results from Ex-
periment 1 suggest that the effect of repeated retellings and discus-
sion over a short time period of about three weeks will not be very 
noticeable. 
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